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The case as presented by Dr Stevenson et al. con-
tains a number of very interesting points for dis-
cussion. However, I would like to concentrate on 
the issue of diagnosis, and the argument made that 
when cases become very complex, the diagnostic 
system, as we currently know it in DSM-IV, appears 
to fail us on a number of issues. The fi rst issue may 
be that the distinctions between Axis I and Axis 
II disorders become blurred in that, as in this case, 
it is diffi cult to know where the social phobia and 
other anxiety symptoms end and the avoidant per-
sonality disorder begins. Or, in a similar vein in 
this case, it is diffi cult to know where the major 
depression ends and the borderline personality dis-
order begins or where the borderline personality 
disorder ends and the eating disorder and other 
obsessive–compulsive symptoms and behaviours 
begin. It does appear, as Dr Stevenson et al. write, 
that having one of these multiple disorders, i.e. 
meeting the DSM criteria for the disorder, facili-
tates the development or at least the clinical 
expression of one of the other disorders. This then 
leads to multiple diagnoses and multiple disorders, 
and the roadmap to logical and rational and 
sequenced treatment can become very compli-
cated, if not downright chaotic.
If the point is pressed, we might fi nd that there 
really is very little that distinguishes the two axes 
from each other, no matter how hard the develop-
ers of DSM-III tried to suggest that there were real 
reasons to divide diagnoses between the axes. In 
1986, Gunderson and Pollack pointed out that 
many of the assumptions that we make to distin-
guish Axis I disorders from Axis II disorders are 
more myth than reality. And in the 20 years since 
the Gunderson and Pollack article was written, the 
distinctions between the disorders on the two axes 
in terms of genetic predisposition and other bio-
logical underpinnings, treatability and types of 
treatments, and chronicity and course of illness, 
appear to have become much less distinct, if in 
truth they have not disappeared altogether (Silk, 
1996).
Thus, it appears that it might be useful to put 
all the diagnoses on the same axis and, perhaps in 
that way, to give these diagnoses equal weight. 
While I have no objection to this, I also think that 
perhaps something will be lost in eliminating Axis 
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II. In this age of rapid diagnosis and even more 
rapid treatment, the ‘diagnosis’ that is often made 
on Axis II is ‘deferred’. In some ways this ‘deferred’ 
label may refl ect the fact that we are often asked, 
in a very short time, to make a defi nitive statement 
about character structure and the disorder(s) of 
that structure based upon a single or a very few 
number of interviews. Many of us hoped that the 
existence of Axis II might make the hurried clini-
cian pause for a moment to consider, at least, what 
character structure and what defences and methods 
of coping this person whom we are currently inter-
viewing might possess from day to day and month 
to month, and not just for the moment to moment 
period during which we are examining him or her. 
But Axis II has not been utilized in this manner, 
though if Axis II becomes more dimensional and 
becomes an Axis where defensive and/or major 
characterological styles and coping abilities (or 
lack of same) might be listed, then perhaps a great 
deal of clinically useful and relevant material 
might be conveyed.
After all, it would appear that the main idea 
about diagnosis is to communicate information 
about a patient. But more recently, the idea behind 
diagnosis appears to be not to convey information, 
but rather to decide on a treatment. This might be 
the reason why the number of diagnoses appears 
to have mushroomed recently into more and more 
narrow categorical defi nitions (Blashfi eld & Fuller, 
1996). Yet, while this growth in the total number 
of diagnoses in the DSM has been occurring, the 
number of diagnoses attributed to a given individ-
ual has also grown, so, as Stevenson et al. write, 
most of our patients appear to have more than one 
diagnosis, and these multiple diagnoses appear to 
come from both axes. Thus, it seems that diag-
noses are no longer used to convey information 
about a patient from one clinician to another; 
rather they appear to now be utilized in order to 
tell us which is the correct treatment for this par-
ticular patient because the patient has this diag-
nosis, and we should know, or the pharmaceutical 
industry has tried to tell us, that this works for this 
particular diagnosis, though in truth it tells us 
nothing about what works for a particular patient 
who might meet the criteria for a specifi c diagno-
sis. While this type of thinking may appear to be 
quite straightforward and useful, it immediately 
breaks down when a patient has more than one 
diagnosis, especially if the different diagnoses are 
supposed to be treated in different ways. We have 
lost so much in the 25 years when each patient 
had a formulation that sometimes explained the 
diagnosis, but mostly tried to formulate the clinical 
history and the current clinical presentation and 
symptoms in a parsimonious paragraph or two. 
If done correctly, these formulations did convey 
much more information than our current diagnos-
tic system gets across, even when the patient has 
multiple diagnoses. The formulations told us some-
thing about the complexity of the person who was 
presenting to us in the consulting room, and often 
made suggestions on how to proceed along a path to 
treatment rather than making a grandiose assump-
tion that arriving at a correct diagnosis will lead 
us immediately to the correct treatment.
I do not mean to imply that all our patients are 
this complex. There are many patients who meet 
the criteria for a single diagnosis and respond well 
to a specifi c well-considered treatment, whether 
that treatment be biological or psychotherapeutic 
or a combination of both. But most of these 
patients, especially those that respond well within 
a short time, never come to us as psychiatrists or 
appear at hospitals or in speciality mental health 
clinics. These individuals are treated by their 
primary care physicians. It is the complex ones—
those who do not fi t into a given diagnosis or, as 
in this instance, fi t into too many diagnoses—that 
appear in our offi ces. And as this case reveals, 
the current diagnostic system fails to adequately 
capture and integrate their complexity, and fi ne-
tuning a diagnostic system that has been split into 
many diagnoses and two axes will not adequately 
lead us in the direction that we need to go in order 
to provide comprehensive and coordinated treat-
ment for them. As we move towards consideration 
of DSM-V, it is time to think about a diagnostic 
process that conveys the intricacy and uncertainty 
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of the complexity of human suffering that we 
encounter daily in our offi ces (Kupfer, First, & 
Regier, 2002).
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